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This research empirically investigated the effectiveness of 
the interest rate policy of the Federal Reserve (Fed) on managing 
the subprime mortgage crisis. The study employed the 
autoregressive distributed lag model (ARDL) to analyze 
the stability of the Fed’s monetary policy, thereby providing 
an alternative analysis tool. Correlation analysis results showed 
a strong positive and statistically significant relationship between 
Fed funds rate and the labor market, a strong negative and 
statistically significant relationship between Fed funds rate and 
the housing market, and a strong negative and statistically 
significant relationship between Fed funds rate and price stability. 
In contrast, results of the ARDL model bounds test for 
cointegration indicated that house price index (HPI), labor market, 
and price stability were cointegrated, hence exhibiting a long-run 
relationship with Fed funds rate. This research demonstrates that 
additional empirical studies using new techniques are required 
to reevaluate the Fisher effect and expand the understanding of 
the mechanism between interest rates and inflation. This issue is 
extremely important, particularly for countries such as the U.S., 
the UK adapting inflation targeting policy using interest rates as 
an operational target. 
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The interest rate represents an essential tool for 
performing monetary policy. Central banks and their 
decisions have different economic impacts as seen 
in the subprime mortgage crisis (SMC). Following 
the dot-com bubble, the Federal Reserve (Fed) 
monetary policy resulted in significant financial 
crises after the Great Depression in 1929. 
Nonetheless, SMC determinants were restricted 
not only to the Fed policy but also to conventional 
banking, securitization on corresponding mortgage 
loans, and credit derivatives that escalated the SMC 
and costing approximately between US$5 trillion  
and US$15 trillion (Adelson, 2013; Arestis & 
Karakitsos, 2009). 
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The SMC started on July 31, 2007, along with 
the bankruptcy of Bear Stearns. The collapse of 
Lehman Brothers (the most abundant individual 
bankruptcy) on September 15, 2008, heightened with 
the crisis, during which the financial system 
changed. Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley were 
transformed into commercial banks. Moreover, 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which took part in 
mortgage securitization, were nationalized using 
US$200 billion of treasury sources. The spillover 
effects of the crisis reached other sectors (Gunay & 
Georgievski, 2018). The SMC sent unprecedented 
shockwaves worldwide and alarming significant 
financial and economic indicators. The magnitude of 
its devastation and the boundary of its effect are 
unparalleled, such that it has been dubbed 
the financial tsunami of modern times. A default of 
a relatively small fraction of mortgage obligors in 
the U.S. has degenerated into a massive liquidity 
crisis and credit crunch. The ripple effect of 
the crisis has threatened 27 national currencies and 
Europe’s global economic powerhouse (Al‐Rjoub & 
Azzam, 2012; Sekmen & Hatipoğlu, 2016). 
The patterns preceding the SMC are familiar. 
They start with economic expansion coupled with 
low interest rates, stock market activity, and 
an increase in real-estate prices (Antoniades, 2016; 
Gunay & Georgievski, 2018). A wrong policy that 
creates a systematic failure often triggers a crisis.  
In the case of the SMC, it was triggered by subprime 
loans designed to target low-income individuals to 
increase homeownership and, thus, their welfare 
(Page, 2014). Contrary to intended policy outcomes, 
this policy resulted in one of the most severe 
financial crises in human history. The occurrence of 
the SMC has been attributed to the Fed’s low interest 
rates during that time. Although this period of low 
interest rates spurred investments, it increased 
financial market speculations (Li, 2013). 
The SMC in 2007 resulted in a drop in equity 
values and GDB by approximately between US$10 
trillion and US$12 trillion and 5.25%, respectively, 
and a temporary decline in household wealth in 
the U.S. by US$16 trillion, whereas SMS write-downs 
were estimated at US$4.1 trillion (Adelson, 2013).  
As a response, the government interfered in 
the market by re-establishing trust in the financial 
market. First, the U.S. Treasury invested $700 billion 
in the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) for 
purchasing mortgage assets from troubled financial 
institutions (Mishkin, 2011). Additionally, many 
central banks and governments worldwide started 
different financial programs to reduce the effect  
of the SMC and stop its contagion effects.  
Other policies included changes in regulation and 
monetary policy, direct investment in companies, 
and the adoption of different relief programs  
(Allen & Carletti, 2010). 
The financial system collapse, along with real 
economic activities, struck the attention of 
contemporary economists in the period. The authors 
analyzed different aspects that contributed to 
the SMC and were affected by it. Therefore, in this 
study, we empirically investigate the effectiveness of 
the Fed’s interest rate policy SMC management. This 
investigation significantly contributes to the existing 
literature in two ways. First, this paper employs 
a comprehensive list of interaction variables, namely, 
the Fed funds rate, the U.S. labor market and 
housing market, and price stability, to shed light on 
their cointegrating properties. Second, ARDL 
methods are employed to analyze the stability of 
the Fed monetary policy. 
The remaining sections of this paper are 
organized as follows. Section 2 presents the literature 
review. Section 3 provides theoretical information 
for the ARDL model used in the empirical analysis. 
Section 4 reports the main empirical results. Finally, 
Section 5 draws the conclusion and remarks, 
implications, and suggestions for further research. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The collapse of the global financial system had far-
reaching effects on financial markets, culminating  
in the worst economic downturn since the Great 
Depression of the 1930s. This turn of events caught 
the interest of contemporary economists who have 
conducted numerous studies on the global impact 
of the collapses. Particularly, various studies have 
analyzed the different aspects that contributed to 
the SMC and were affected by it. However, despite 
the intensified research, the current literature  
on the impact of the Fed policy on economic activities 
and macroeconomic indicators is scant. 
An analysis of the SMC requires a discussion of 
its main causes, namely, the growth of subprime 
mortgages, securitization, and adjustable-rate 
mortgage (ARM). Moreover, the strategy used to 
mitigate the crisis also requires a discussion. 
Furthermore, the link between the crisis, economic 
activity, and macroeconomic goals is essential in 
the light of this research. The aforementioned points 
are discussed below. 
 
2.1. Causes of the crisis 
 
The first stream of literature claimed that the Fed’s 
mismanaged monetary policy between 2001 and 
2003 initially triggered the financial crisis. The low 
interest rate set by Fed Chair Alan Greenspan 
contributed to the growth of the housing sector, 
resulting in a real estate bubble1 (Page, 2014). 
Moreover, the ironically low interest rates during 
this period contributed to the increase in the demand 
on high-yielding new financial derivatives (Bech, 
Gambacorta, & Kharroubi, 2014; Srivastava, 2015). 
Consequently, the interest rates on ARM2 reduced. 
As a direct result, banks started competing by 
reducing their credit requirements. In addition, credit 
ratings that were disregarded increased demand for 
housing and housing loans, which inflated housing 
prices throughout the U.S. (AboElsoud, AlQudah, & 
Paparas, 2021). 
The second line of literature analyzed the links 
between the SMC and demand-side factors that 
contributed to the rapid expansion of the U.S. 
mortgage market. They analyzed the asymmetric 
causality linkages between credit growth and output 
growth during the SMC (Dell’Ariccia, Igan, & Laeven, 
2012; Moldogaziev & Guzman, 2015; Serwa, 2012). 
They argued that ignoring borrowers’ credit ratings 
and low mortgage denial rates contributed to 
                                                          
1 In December 2001, the Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan lowered 
the federal fund rate to 1.75 percent. The Fed lowered it again in 
November 2002 to 1.24 percent. 
2 However, according to the Joint Center for Housing Studies (2008), later 
ARM increased sharply from 4.5 percent in 2006 to 8.4 percent in 2007 
(as cited in Bible & Joiner, 2009). 
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the growth of credit demand3. Moreover, they 
claimed that lenders in areas with high credit demand 
growth downplayed candidates’ debt-to-income 
ratios. These results are consistent with the notion 
that the relaxation of lending standards led to 
the largest credit boom in U.S. history that triggered 
the collapse of the market. 
The third stream of research argued that 
securitization was one of the main reasons for  
the spread of SMC worldwide (Dou, Liu, Richardson, 
& Vyas, 2014; Le, Narayanan, & Vo, 2016).  
The securitization of subprime mortgages into 
collateralized debt obligations and mortgage-backed 
securities was a major contributing factor to 
the SMC. Their findings show investors’ recognition 
of the increased credit risk as the SMC progressed 
and banks’ loss of interest in securitization.  
The major problem was that banks provided 
ingenious securitizations that offered capital relief 
but did not transfer the risk, which is the main 
purpose of the process. Banks failed when real-
estate prices collapsed because the risks associated 
with the securitized mortgages remained on their 
balance sheets. Their failure was magnified by 
the absence of insufficient capital during the crisis 
(Le et al., 2016). Moreover, reflecting on Ryan’s (2008) 
argument that the crisis evolved in waves, issuers of 
subprime mortgage securities were aware of 
the increase in and retention of the credit risk by 
early 2006. Therefore, this finding could indicate 
that the credit risk retention by the capital market 
assessment related to securitized assets was 
inadequate or inaccurate. 
The final strand of literature claimed that ARM 
was one of the causes of the SMC (Bible & 
Joiner, 2009; OECD, 2015; Pavlov & Wachter, 2011). 
They explained that ARM had highly unfavorable 
terms and could worsen after the adjustment period. 
Aggressive lending instruments increased the price 
declines in real estate markets. In addition, markets 
that experienced a decline after the financial crisis 
and negative demand shock have significantly less 
loan supply due to aggressive lending withdrawal 
and predatory lending. Although low short-term 
rates attracted borrowers to take out mortgages, 
many borrowers were unable to maintain new  
higher payments after the mortgage reset (Berger & 
Frame, 2007). In addition, aggressive mortgage 
lending increased borrowing. These instruments 
increased the price of underlying assets because 
the borrowers’ constraints are now relaxed; thus, 
they can demand the asset. This finding is 
supported by a line of literature showing that 
inflated asset prices could be due to underpricing  
in bank lending risks (Allen & Gale, 1998, 1999;  
Herring & Wachter, 1999; Pavlov & Wachter, 2011). 
 
2.2. Solving the crisis 
 
The Fed decreased the interest rates to solve the SMC. 
This response to the crisis did not significantly 
differ from that of the governments and many 
central banks. They mainly provided extraordinary 
credits to banks and key firms. Moreover, they 
recapitalized banks and acquired the majority of 
ownership in certain banks to mitigate the crisis. 
Fiscal policy was not an option during the crisis due 
                                                          
3 Banks ignored the credit ratings of borrowers and lowered the credit 
conditions required to increase their own profit. 
to large government borrowings before the crisis. 
Moreover, policymakers were aware of fiscal policy 
lags, which will destabilize the economy when they 
become effective. In addition, conventional monetary 
policy, including lowering interest rates, was not 
effective. 
Prior to the crisis, prevailing interest rates were 
low after a period of low inflation levels in several 
countries. Countries hit the zero-lower bound by 
lowering the interest rates further. Thus, conventional 
monetary policy was unable to respond further. 
Consequently, the Fed used monetary policy tools 
unconventionally to stimulate economic activity.  
The central bank opted for further asset purchases 
on its account despite a zero-bound interest rate. 
Moreover, it influenced markets’ expectations 
through public statements about the future of 
monetary policy actions. Friedman (2015) explained 
that future monetary policy practices will continue 
to include large-scale asset purchases mainly 
because central bank activities have reduced long-
term interest rates compared with short-term ones. 
Moreover, they lowered the interest rates on riskier 
obligations. Blanchard, Dell’Ariccia, and Mauro (2010) 
and Richter and Dimitrios (2013) stated that central 
banks should consider using reserve requirements 
to complement their interest rate policies for 
the achievement of their macroeconomic objectives. 
They showed the need for changes in the U.S. and 
around the world. The U.S. needs a single monetary 
authority that will react quicker and stronger 
to adverse economic environmental changes than 
numerous agencies. 
This research discusses the effectiveness of 
the Fed interest rate on three aspects. First, the U.S. 
labor market was largely affected by the crisis. 
During the SMC, the U.S. faced its highest job losses 
since World War II, leading financial aid programs, 
such as TARP, to aim at the job market (Goodman & 
Mance, 2011). A period of stable economic growth 
and a healthy labor market in 2006 preceded 
the recession period. According to Goodman and 
Mance (2011), employment prior to the crisis was 
concentrated in health, education, and housing 
market-related industries. The housing market is 
cyclical and sensitive to economic growth changes. 
Therefore, this market was hit hard after 
the occurrence of the crisis, resulting in a drop  
in U.S. employment. The construction sector lost 
approximately 57,000 jobs a month (Kelter, 2009). 
Half of the TARP finance aimed at helping 
the manufacturing industry, including Chrysler  
and General Motors, and the financial industry,  
such as AIG. This activity was mainly done because 
the manufacturing industry was also adversely 
affected by the SMC. Furthermore, average monthly 
lob losses rocketed to 73,000 in 2008, totaling to 
875,000 in job decline in this sector only in 2008 
(Kelter, 2009). 
Second, the U.S. housing market is the most 
sensitive in periods of boom-and-bust cycles. 
According to the National Association of Home 
Builders, the U.S. housing market activity (residential 
investment) contributes approximately 5% to the U.S. 
GDP. This GDP percentage includes investment in 
the construction of single and multi-family housing, 
in addition to remodeling costs and other associated 
fees, such as brokerage fees. The housing sector is 
the first to increase when the economy booms. 
However, it was also the first to decline during 
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the SMC due to its policies that primarily caused  
the SMC. The U.S. homeownership policy and 
legislation have been an official government policy for 
decades (Avery & Brevoort, 2015). Homeownership 
can promote the welfare of low-income households. 
However, lending low-income borrowers reduced 
the underwriting standards, hence inflating  
the housing bubble (Avery & Brevoort, 2015). 
Furthermore, securitization created a market for 
securitized mortgages amounting to US$3.6 trillion. 
According to the U.S. Census Bureau, this news by 
the market was accompanied by a period of low 
interest rate and fraudulent lending practices, which 
have burst the housing market creating a housing 
bubble of new unsold homes. In July 2006, 
573,000 houses were vacant, which is 50% higher 
than the previous increase during the saving and 
loans crisis in 1989 (Keys, Mukherjee, Seru, &  
Vig, 2010). 
Finally, price stability benefits economic growth 
as it allows investors and consumers to better 
predict future prices and allocate investments and 
spending optimally. Therefore, price stability is one 
of the most important goals of monetary and fiscal 
policy to support sustainable economic growth 
rates. Hence, one measure of an effective monetary 
policy is its ability to manage expected future 
inflation rates. When inflation is high, it interferes 
with economic efficiency and thus can reduce 
economic growth. In addition, when high inflation is 
expected, reducing inflation can be painful. Financial 
crises, such as the SMC, can be considered as 
a natural experiment that tests investors’ and 
consumers’ ability to predict future prices and 
allocate investments and spending. Therefore, 
the Fed’s continued expansionary monetary policy 
gives rise to speculation whether it can maintain 
price stability in the coming decades (El-Shagi & 
Giesen, 2014; Trehan & Zorrilla, 2012). 
 
2.3. Impact of the crisis 
 
Recent findings of the analysis of the different 
aspects affected by the global financial crisis need 
to be highlighted based on the discussion of 
the contributing factors of the SMC and the specific 
solutions. Particularly, the crisis affected the labor 
market, housing market, and price stability. 
Recent findings explained the link between SMC 
and real economic activity indicators. With respect 
to the labor market, findings showed that 
the severity of the SMC’s impact on the labor market 
largely depends on the depth of the demand shock, 
the scale of adjustments in production volume, and 
the extent of adjustments in wages, working time, 
and labor productivity (Artha & Haan, 2011; Bryan, 
2010; Gaston & Rajaguru, 2015; Kwiatkowski, 2016). 
Moreover, the International Monetary Fund4 (2009) 
showed that the impact of the crisis on the labor 
market depends on certain institutional factors, 
such as the employment protection legislation, types 
of wage bargaining arrangements, and the level and 
duration of unemployment benefits. Additionally, 
other studies have shown that the impact varies 
across countries based on the degree of economic 
openness, dependence on natural resources, and 
liberalization of the banking system (Osakwe, 
Santos-Paulino, & Dogan, 2018). 
                                                          
4 https://www.imf.org/external/index.htm 
Regarding the housing market, extant literature 
has shown that it is the most sensitive in periods 
before and after the financial crisis and economic 
growth periods promote the real estate market 
because banks perceive real estate as safe 
investments. By contrast, households perceive real 
estate investment as a safe and stable option that 
increases in demand with increased borrowing 
easiness (Bardos & Zaiats, 2011; Barkham, 2013). 
Furthermore, Tran, Hoang, and Tran (2018) stated 
that the SMC causes liquidity shocks, the large price 
decline in mortgage markets, large vacancies, and 
missed investment opportunities. Consequently,  
the lack of liquidity and investors worldwide 
influenced markets during the SMC. 
Inflation targeting is one of the most important 
tools for controlling the prevailing inflation level  
in an economy by announcing to the public 
a quantitative inflation target to be achieved within 
a certain time (Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin, & Posen, 
1999; Mishkin, 2011). Several studies highlight that 
inflation targeting is positively correlated with 
economic performance (Summa & Serrano, 2018). 
However, countries with flexible inflation targeting 
regimes could not adjust to desirable inflation levels 
during the SMC (Chaudhuri, Kim, & Yongcheol, 2016; 
Fouejieu, 2013; Primus & Mahabir, 2011; Tugcu & 
Ozturk, 2015). Additionally, price stability cannot 
sufficiently attain financial stability or prevent 
the crisis. 
The review presented above shows that 
findings on the impact of the Fed policy on 
economic activity and macroeconomic indicators are 
limited, almost non-existing in the literature.  
The majority of previous research focuses on 
the causes of SMC and its impact on several markets 
and evaluations of the policies applied during that 
time. Hence, this paper aims to fill this gap in  
the literature. To the best of the researchers’ 
knowledge, this study is the first to investigate 
the impact of the Fed’s interest rate policy on  
the U.S. labor and housing markets and price 
stability using a comprehensive list of interaction 
variables. Section 3 below presents the methodology 
and data analysis of this study. 
 
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1. Data collection and transformation 
 
Monthly data for the period from 1993 to 2019  
for the U.S. was retrieved from the World Bank 
Indicators, and the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’ 
Database (FRED). The study primarily uses Pesaran 
and Shin’s (1999), Pesaran, Shin, and Smith’s (2001) 
version of the ARDL model, and following, in 
particular, the research methodology of Al Qudah, 
Zouaoui, and Aboelsoud (2020), a theoretical 
framework of the general macroeconomic model  
was proposed that takes into consideration 
the interdependence among the FED monetary policy, 
housing market, labor market, and price stability.  
The selected variables consist of the exogenous 
variable federal fund rate (FFR), while endogenous 
variables are housing price index (HPI), labor force 
participation rate (LFP), and consumer price 
index (CPI). No transformation has been done to 
the data; however, all series are seasonally adjusted. 
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3.2. Empirical framework 
 
As mentioned earlier, this study aims to empirically 
investigate the effectiveness of the interest rate 
policy of the Fed funds rate on the housing market, 
labor market, and price stability using the following 
three models: 
Model 1 represents HPI and FFR as exogenous 
and endogenous variables, respectively. 
Model 2 represents LFP and FFR as endogenous 
and exogenous variables, respectively. 
Model 3 represents CPI and FFR as endogenous 
and exogenous variables, respectively. 
 
 Model 1  
 
𝐻𝑃𝐼𝑡 = 𝛽01 + 𝛽11𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑡 + 1𝑡  (1) 
 
 Model 2  
 
𝐿𝐹𝑃𝑡 = 𝛽02 + 𝛽12𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑡 + 2𝑡  (2) 
 
 Model 3  
 
𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡 = 𝛽03 + 𝛽13𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑡 + 3𝑡  (3) 
 
where, FFR, HPI, LFP, and CPI are the Fed funds rate, 
house price index (HPI), labor force participation (LFP) 
rate, and consumer price index (CPI), respectively, 𝑖𝑡 
is the disturbance terms, which are assumed to be 
normally distributed and serially uncorrelated, 𝛽0𝑖 is 
the model intercepts, and 𝛽1𝑖 is the FFR coefficients 
in each model. 
Models 1–3 represent the relationship of time 
theseries (panel) data. Thus, of allstationarity
variables in the model must be tested using 
the augmented Dickey and Fuller (1979) and Phillips 
and Perron (1988) tests. Furthermore, the ARDL 
bounds test (Pesaran et al., 2001) model has been 
used for a cointegration test. 
This approach is not the only advantage of 
the ARDL model given its several advantages over 
traditional methods. In addition to estimating the 
short- and long-run relationships among variables,  
it considers the endogeneity problem by adding 
different lags of the dependent and independent 
variables to the model. The optimal number of lags 
are selected according to different selection criteria 
(BIC, Akaike information criterion [AIC], R2, and LL) 
using the vector autoregressive (VAR) model. 
The cointegration test results using the ARDL 
with two models showed long-run relationships 
in Models 1.1, 2.1, and 3.1 and short-run relationships 
in Models 1.3, 2.3, and 3.3 through the restricted 
error correction model (ECM). 
The long-run relationships of HPI, LFP, and CPI 
with FFR in Models 1– bounds3 using the ARDL
approach can be written as follows: 
 






+ 1𝑡 (1.1) 
 






+ 2𝑡 (2.1) 
 






+ 3𝑡 (3.1) 
 
where, 𝑛0, … , 𝑛3 are the optimal numbers of lags for 
model alsoARDLVAR. Theusingeach variable
cointegrationthefor visualizingprovides tools
(long- testit using the boundstestingandterm)
tests forbounds approachARDLprocedure. The
cointegration among variables in all models  
(Pesaran et al., 2001). It produces F-statistics along 
threeatvalueswith lower and upper critical
different significant levels (1%, 5%, and 10%).  
The F-test statistics should be above the upper bound 
to reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration. 
Then, the ARDL procedure estimates the short-run 
model (based on Model 2) using the ECM presented 
as follows: 
 






+ 𝛿1𝐸𝐶𝑡−1 + 1𝑡 (1.2) 
 






+ 𝛿2𝐸𝐶𝑡−1 + 2𝑡 (2.2) 
 






+ 𝛿3𝐸𝐶𝑡−1 + 3𝑡 (3.2) 
 
where, 𝛥 is the first difference, 𝛿′𝑠 are the speed of 
adjustment parameter of error correction term (ECT) 
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Finally, model diagnostic tests were used to 
check the ARDL model assumptions. All models 
were checked for serial correlation using the 
Lagrange multiplier (LM) test, and homoscedasticity 
was checked by applying the Breusch–Pagan test. 
Ramsey’s regression equation specification error test 
(RESET) was used for any model misspecification. 
The stability of the coefficients was checked through 
the cumulative sum (CUSUM) and cumulative  
sum of squares (CUSUMSQ) of recursive residuals 
(Bani-Mustafa, Matawie, Finch, Al-Nasser, & Ciavolino, 
2019; Brown, Durbin, & Evans, 1975). 
4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 1 presents the descriptive analysis and 
correlations of the variables. The descriptive analysis 
shows the distribution properties of individual 
variables, whereas the correlation matrix shows 
the relationship between the variables of interest 
of the period of study from 1993 to 2019. 
 
 
Table 1. Summary statistics and correlations 
 
 HPI LFP CPI FFR 
Mean 139.48 65.29 84.37 2.59 
Median 144.79 66.00 85.16 2.00 
Maximum 213.84 67.30 109.06 6.54 
Minimum 76.79 62.40 60.25 0.07 
Standard deviation 40.66 1.64 14.45 2.19 
Skewness -0.10 -0.51 -0.04 0.29 
Kurtosis 1.79 1.62 1.67 1.52 
Jarque–Bera 20.361 39.992 23.982 34.162 
Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Obs. 324 324 324 324 
HPI 1.000    
LFP -0.73 1.000   
CPI 0.90 -0.90 1.000  
FFR -0.53 0.75 -0.71 1.000 
Notes: Variable definitions: HPI, LFP, CPI, and FFR are the house price index, labour force participation rate, consumer price index, and 
federal fund rate, respectively. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Table 1 above shows that the mean, median, 
measures of dispersion around the mean, skewness, 
kurtosis, and probabilities of the Jarque–Berra test 
statistic indicate a normal distribution in 
the process. Additionally, FFR and LFP have a strong 
positive and statistically significant relationship. 
However, FFR and all other variables in this study 
have a strong negative and statistically significant 
relationship. Therefore, all the correlation signs are 
consistent with economic theory. 
Moreover, Figure 1 shows the trends of our 
main variables of interest for the study period of 
1993–2019. In the Fed funds rate trend graph, 
FFR started around 3 and jumped to 6 in 1995 and 
stayed high (above 4) up to mid-2001 before it 
started to decline (reaching a minimum of 1) up to 
mid-2004. Subsequently, it started to increase 
reaching a level of 5 (by mid-2006) before it 
decreased reaching 0.2 at the end of 2008. It stayed 
around 0.3 until the end of 2016 before it increased 
reaching 2.4 in mid-2019. Thereafter, it started to 
decline to reach a value of 1.6 by the end of 2019. 
The average FFR over the study period was 2.59 with 
a high standard deviation, minimum, and maximum 
of 2.19, 0.07, and 6.54, respectively, as illustrated 
in Table 1. 
The HPI trend graph shows a quadratic increase 
reaching a high value of 184 by the end of 2006 
before it decreased to 137 at the beginning of 2012. 
Then, it increased linearly reaching a maximum 
value of nearly 214 by the end of 2019. The average 
HPI was 139.5 (standard deviation = 40.7), with 
a range from 76.8 to 213.8. 
In contrast, the LFP rate trend graph shows that 
the LFP was above 66 with fluctuations until the end 
of 2008 before it declined, reaching a minimum 
rate of 62.4 at the end of 2015. Subsequently, 
it increased gradually reaching 63.2 at the end 
of 2019. The average LFP was 65.29 with a low 
standard deviation (1.64) that varied between 62.4 
and a maximum of 67.3. 
The CPI trend graph shows almost a straight-
line increase during the entire study period, with 
an average of 84.37 and a standard deviation of 
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4.2. Unit root test 
 
The unit root tests form one of the essential 
requirements in time series econometrics because 
working with non-stationary time series would lead 
to spurious results in empirical studies due to 
unstable data representation. Table 2 summarizes 
the unit root test results for all variables using ADF 
and PP tests. Both tests illustrate that all variables 
are I(1) and none is I(2), which requires checking 
before applying the ARDL. Pesaran and Pesaran 
(1997) argued that ARDL results would be biased if 
any of the variables are stationary at level I(2). 
 
Table 2. ADF and Phillips-Perron unit root tests 
 
Variable 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test Phillips-Perron test 
Order of integration Level First difference Level First difference 
T-value T-value T-value T-value 
HPI -0.70 -3.16** 2.87 -3.84* I(1) 
LFP -0.01 -22.25*** -0.07 -22.38*** I(1) 
CPI -0.02 -11.95*** 0.02 -10.78*** I(1) 
FFR -1.64 -6.36*** -1.59 -8.67*** I(1) 
Notes: * is significant at 10% level, ** at 5% level and *** at 1% level.  
Lag orders used in tests are selected automatically according to Akaike information criterion (AIC) and Schwarz information 
criterion (SIC). 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
The ADF and PP test results in Table 2 affirm 
that all variables, namely, HPI, LFP, CPI, and FFR, 
contain unit roots. Thus, all are integrated I(1). 
These results indicate that the series are integrated 
in the same order. Therefore, the variables under 
discussion may have a long-run relationship.  
Then, the ARDL bounds test (cointegration test) 
was performed to check the existence of such 
a relationship. 
 
4.3. Autoregressive distributed lag bounds test 
(cointegration test) 
 
The ARDL bounds test for cointegration is based on 
Wald’s F-test statistics, with critical values provided 
by Pesaran et al. (2001). The best fitted ARDL model 
is selected automatically based on AIC. The F-test 
statistics should be more than the upper bound I(1) 
at a 5% level of significance to have a cointegration. 
Table 3 illustrates that the F-test statistics 
results for the ARDL bounds test for cointegration 
of our three models are all above the lower bound 
I0 (3.62) and upper bound I1 (4.16) at a 5% level of 
significance. Therefore, HPI, labor market, and price 
stability are cointegrated, that is, they have a long-run 












94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 18










94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 18








94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 18








94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 18
Consumer Price Index
Journal of Governance and Regulation / Volume 10, Issue 2, Special Issue, 2021 
 
233 
Table 3. Cointegration ARDL bounds test results 
 











HPI ARDL (10, 1) (Equation 1) 5.44 0.99 0.36 (0.70) 0.44 (0.66) -1.27 (0.2) Cointegrated 
LFP ARDL (7, 2) (Equation 2) 4.65 0.99 2.21 (0.11) 0.11 (0.91) 1.15 (0.33) Cointegrated 
CPI ARDL (3, 4) (Equation 3) 20.88 0.99 0.15 (0.86) 1.23 (0.22) 0.15 (0.86) Cointegrated 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Equation (1.3) summarizes the long-run HPI 
(level) equation results with significant coefficients 
at a 1% level as follows: 
 
𝐶𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑞 =  𝐻𝑃𝐼 − (−20.3 𝐹𝐹𝑅 + 206.44) (1.3) 
 
FFR is negatively and statistically associated 
with HPI, with a coefficient of –20.3. Therefore,  
a 1% increase in FFR will decrease HPI by 20.3%. 
Equation (2.3) summarizes the long-run labor 
force (level) equation results, with significant 
coefficients at a 1% level as follows: 
 
𝐶𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑞 =  𝐿𝐹𝑃 − (1.01 𝐹𝐹𝑅 + 61.98) (2.3) 
 
FFR is positively and statistically associated  
(in the long run) with labor market index, with 
a coefficient of 1.01. Therefore, a 1% increase in FFR 
will increase the LFP rate by 1.01%. 
Equation (3.3) summarizes the long-run price 
stability (level) equation results, with significant 
coefficients at 1% and 5% levels for the FFR and 
the constant, respectively, as follows: 
 
𝐶𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑞 =  𝐶𝑃𝐼 − (−8.4 𝐹𝐹𝑅 + 52) (3.3) 
 
FFR is negatively and statistically associated  
(in the long run) with price stability, with a coefficient 
of −8.4. Therefore, a 1% increase in FFR will decrease 
CPI by 8.4%. 
All the ARDL models were checked for serial 
correlation, homoscedasticity, and stability using 
the LM test, Breusch–Pagan test, and Ramsey’s RESET, 
respectively, as shown in Table 3. All p-values are 
above the significance level of 5%, indicating  
a correct ARDL model without autocorrelation, 
homoscedasticity, stability problems. Hence, our 
three models are stable and correctly specified. 
4.4. Autoregressive distributed lag short-run models 
 
Table 4 summarizes the parameter estimates of our 
three main short-run ECMs. It summarizes the short-
run relationship between FFR and HPI (Model 1), FFR 
and LFP rate (Model 2), and FFR and CPI (Model 3). 
Short-run error correction model (Model 1.2) 
results show that HPI is significantly and positively 
associated with a one-month lag of 𝛥𝐻𝑃𝐼(−1) and 
with 𝛥𝐻𝑃𝐼(−9). A 1% increase in 𝛥𝐻𝑃𝐼(−1) and 
 𝛥𝐻𝑃𝐼(−9) will increase HPI by 0.86% and 0.14%, 
respectively, in the short run. A large change in HPI 
in the short run is not expected because all 
coefficients are less than 1. As expected, the ECT (−1) 
is negative and significant at the 1% level, with only 
0.16% of the monthly speed of convergent toward 
equilibrium. 
Short-run LFP in Model 2.2 shows that LFP is 
negatively and significantly associated with all 
lagged differences from 1 to 6 months and with 
𝛥(𝐹𝐹𝑅[−1]). LFP is positively associated with 𝛥(𝐹𝐹𝑅), 
with a coefficient of 0.14. ECT is also negative and 
significant at a 1% level, with a 2% monthly speed of 
convergent toward equilibrium. 
The short-run CPI model with FFR (Model 3.2) 
shows that CPI is negatively and significantly 
associated with 𝛥(𝐶𝑃𝐼[−2]) and 𝛥(𝐹𝐹𝑅[−3]). However, 
CPI is positively associated with 𝛥(𝐹𝐹𝑅) and 
𝛥(𝐶𝑃𝐼[−1]). ECT is not negative but close to zero and 
significant at a 1% level. This finding indicates that 
the long-run relationship between CPI and FFR has 
a structural break. The stability of the estimated 
parameters using short- and long-run ARDL models 
(for our three models) is investigated using CUSUM 
and CUSUMSQ tests to address this issue. 
 
 
Table 4. Short-run coefficient of ARDL models (ECM) 
 
Model 1.2 (HPI), ARDL (10, 1) Model 2.2 (LFP), ARDL (7, 2) Model 3.2 (CPI), ARDL (3, 4) 
Variable Estimates Variable Estimates Variable Estimates 
Δ(HPI(-1)) 0.86 (0.057)*** Δ(LFP(-1)) -0.28 (0.056)*** Δ(CPI(-1)) 0.47 (0.055)*** 
Δ(HPI(-2)) 0.052 (0.076) Δ(LFP(-2)) -0.12 (0.057)** Δ(CPI(-2)) -0.19 (0.055)*** 
Δ(HPI(-3)) -0.11 (0.057) Δ(LFP(-3)) -0.12 (0.057)** Δ(FFR) 0.3 (0.09)*** 
Δ(HPI(-4)) 0.11 (0.075) Δ(LFP(-4)) -0.15 (0.057)*** Δ(FFR(-1)) 0.12 (0.101) 
Δ(HPI(-5)) -0.11 (0.075) Δ(LFP(-5)) -0.14 (0.057)** Δ(FFR(-2)) -0.065 (0.101) 
Δ(HPI(-6)) 0.10 (0.075) Δ(LFP(-6)) -0.09 (0.056)* Δ(FFR(-3)) -0.25 (0.09)*** 
Δ(HPI(-7)) -0.10 (0.075) Δ(FER) 0.14 (0.056)**   
Δ(HPI(-8)) 0.05 (0.076) Δ(FER(-1)) -0.08 (0.057)**   
Δ(HPI(-9)) 0.11 (0.058)*     
Δ(FER) 0.14 (0.099)     
ECT(-1) -0.0016 (0.0004)***  -0.02 (0.004)***  0.002 (0.0003)*** 
Note: * is significant at 10% level, ** at 5% level, and *** at 1% level.  
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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CUSUM and CUSUMSQ graphs (Figure 2) were 
generated to check the stability of the parameters 
at a 5% level of significance (red lines) for Model 1. 
The plots in Figure 2 show that the long-run 
coefficients are stable and within 5% boundaries. 
However, this result does not apply to CUSUMSQ, 
which captured a sudden shift in parameters at 
the beginning but regained stability (in the long run), 
within 5% limits. This observation is evidence of 
structural change in the data and may be due to 
the 2000 and 2008 financial crises. Therefore, HPI is 
highly sensitive to financial crisis and FFR. 
Figure 3 illustrates the CUSUM and CUSUMSQ 
graphs for Model 2. The plots show that the long-run 
coefficients are stable and within 5% boundaries. 
Thus, the labor force market is not as sensitive as 
the home market to the financial crisis. 
Finally, Figure 4 illustrates the CUSUM and 
CUSUMSQ graphs for Model 3. The CUSUM plot 
shows that the long-run coefficients are stable and 
within 5% boundaries. However, the CUSUMSQ 
suddenly shifted at the beginning but regained 
stability (in the long run) within 5% limits. This 
finding reveals that the existence of structural 
change in the data, which may be due to the 2000 
and 2008 financial crises. 
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This study aimed to empirically investigate 
the effectiveness of the Fed interest rate policy  
on SMC management. The study analyzed 
the effectiveness of interest rate policy of the Fed 
funds rate on the housing market, labor market, and 
price stability. Accordingly, the study employed 
a list of interaction variables, namely, the Fed funds 
rate, the U.S. labor market, U.S. housing market, and 
price stability, to examine cointegrating properties 
between the identified variables. An ARDL model  
is also used to analyze the stability of the Fed 
monetary policy. 
The correlation analysis results revealed  
a strong positive and statistically significant 
relationship between FFR and LFP and a strong 
negative and statistically significant relationship 
between FFR and HPI and between FFR and CPI. 
These findings are consistent with the research 
expectations and economic theory. Furthermore, 
the ARDL bounds test results for cointegration 
indicated that HPI, labor market, and price stability 
were cointegrated, hence exhibiting a long-run 
relationship with FFR. The findings revealed 
a negative and statistically significant relationship 
between FFR and HPI and between FFR and CPI and 
a positive and statistically significant relationship 
between FFR and LPI. 
In terms of labor market, this relationship has 
several explanations, which may be an indirect 
relationship or due to the small sample size of 
the analysis. The indirect relationship may be formed 
by the low interest rates, which enhance the economy 
through increased lending that reduces the 
unemployment level and thus the unemployment-
related benefits. 
Many researchers have focused on 
the cointegration relationship between interest rates 
and the housing sector since the worldwide 2008 
financial crisis. However, they ignored 
the probability of a changing relationship between 
the examined variables due to a structural break 
attributed to the global financial crisis. Thus, future 
studies can include this observation in their analysis. 
Understanding the mechanism and relationship 
between interest rates and inflation is significantly 
important for effective and timely economic choices 
of economic actors instituting monetary policy.  
The Fisher effect suggests that the nominal interest 
rate and expected inflation rate have a one-on-one 
positive relationship. 
One essential problem is that the federal funds 
rate was not the only instrument of monetary policy 
between early 2009 and late 2018; instead, 
the interest rate paid on required and excess reserve 
balances was also implemented as a policy 
instrument. Accordingly, future research will 
provide more information to policymakers to 
consider this shift in the Fed’s underlying policy 
regime, which is a particularly significant problem 
given the small size of the overall sample. 
Furthermore, this research demonstrates 
the need for additional empirical studies using new 
techniques to reevaluate the Fisher effect and 
understand the mechanism between interest rates 
and inflation to a greater extent. This analysis is 
extremely important, particularly for countries such 
as the U.S. and the UK, adapting inflation targeting 
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